Arthur Currie

 ( 1875 Births ) 

Currie was educated in local common schools and at the Strathroy District Collegiate Institute, where he proved to be a good student especially interested in literature. He had plans to pursue a professional career in law or medicine; however, the death of his father when Arthur was fifteen made this impossible due to his limited financial means. Currie instead pursued teacher training, but he was unable to secure a job and returned to high school to complete an honours certificate in order to gain university entrance. In May 1894, mere months before his final exams, Currie quarrelled with one of his teachers, and subsequently left high school to seek his fortune in British Columbia, hoping to take advantage of the financial boom resulting from the construction of the transcontinental railway. However, Currie found no prospects outside of teaching, so he qualified as a teacher in British Columbia and took a teaching position on the Saanich Peninsula north of Victoria, British Columbia. In 1896 Currie moved to Victoria, taking a position at Boy's Central School and later Victoria High School.

Currie took on his role as militia officer seriously. He attended every available course offered by the British Army Contingent at Work Point Barracks in Esquimalt, often ordered military text books from London and was found on the shooting range every Saturday. He was a keen marksman and was elected president of the British Columbia Rifle Association in 1905. Currie was promoted to captain in November 1901, and then to major in 1906. By September 1909, he had risen to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, commanding the 5th Regiment. Apart from his interest in the militia, Currie was also an active Freemason, rising to the position of deputy grandmaster of the Victoria District of Freemasonry in 1907. He also served two years as president of the Young Men's Liberal Association of Victoria, and several times was suggested as a candidate for the provincial legislature.

In addition to his military career, Currie continued to be active in business. He was appointed head of the Matson Insurance Firm in 1904 when Sam Matson, who had many business interests beyond his insurance firm, decided to concentrate his energy on publishing the Daily Colonist. With a land speculation boom in Victoria in full swing, Currie and a Victoria businessman, R. A. Power, formed Currie & Power in 1908. Currie invested heavily in the real estate market. The firm was a success until 1912 when property prices began to decline. In 1913 Currie's financial situation deteriorated rapidly as the value of his real estate holdings decreased and he became financially over-extended. In August, Currie's five-year term as commander of the 5th Regiment came to a close and he faced a forced retirement from the Canadian Militia at the age of 38. At this critical juncture, he was approached to take command of a new militia regiment.

Following the Canadian federal election of 1911, Sam Hughes had ordered a rapid expansion of the national force. The large number of Scottish citizens of Victoria appealed for the formation of a Highland regiment in Victoria to augment the 88th Regiment Victoria Fusiliers, which had been formed in 1912. On 15 August 1913 the government authorized the formation of the 50th Regiment Gordon Highlanders of Canada. The originally designated commanding officer for the new regiment failed to qualify for the post and Currie was approached as a logical replacement. Currie initially turned down the idea, likely recognizing that the cost of the new Highland uniforms and mess bills would only add to his financial problems. His subordinate and friend, Major Garnet Hughes, Sam Hughes' son, was responsible for persuading Currie to reconsider and accept the position. Currie attended the Militia Staff Course conducted by Major Louis Lipsett, future commander of the 3rd Canadian Division, and qualified in March 1914.

Currie was desperate to avoid personal bankruptcy, which would have resulted in a loss in social standing and forced him to resign his commission. On 31 July 1914, Currie received from the Militia Department with which to purchase new uniforms. Instead of using the funds to pay contractor Moore, Taggart and Co for the regimental uniforms, Currie embezzled the funds to pay off his personal debts. The 50th Regiment's honorary colonel, William Coy, had promised to underwrite the regiment with $35,000, and Currie planned to use the funds to pay the uniform contractor. Unfortunately for Currie, Coy did not follow through with his financial commitment to the regiment, leaving Currie's accounting sleight-of-hand potentially exposed.

When World War I broke out and Canada found itself at war on 4 August 1914, Currie was offered command of Military District No.11British Columbia. When he turned this down, he was then offered command of the 2nd Infantry Brigade of the Canadian Expeditionary Force's 1st Canadian Division. Currie considered turning down this offer as well so he could attempt to solve his financial woes. He once again changed his mind at the urging of Garnet Hughes. Currie's promotion to brigadier-general was confirmed on 29 September 1914, and he took command of the 2nd Brigade at the Valcartier Camp in Quebec. When the 50th Regiment's acting commanding officer, Major Cecil Roberts, wrote to him inquiring as to the status of the uniform grant, Currie ignored the correspondence and sailed overseas with his brigade in October 1914.

Currie's leadership during the Second Battle of Ypres was a source of dispute by British historian James Edward Edmonds, who argued that Currie and his 2nd Canadian Brigade performed poorly at Ypres. Currie, supported by the Canadian official historian Colonel Archer Fortescue Duguid, waged a vigorous defense, charging that Edmonds was seeking to diminish the Canadian contribution to the Second Battle of Ypres. Edmonds wrongly accused Currie of ordering his men to retreat on 24 April 1915 because of the chaos caused by the chlorine gas and fierce attacks of the German infantry; Currie and Duguid said it was Brigadier-General Richard Turner, commanding the 3rd Canadian Brigade on Currie's left, who had ordered a retreat without orders, leaving Currie with an exposed left flank. Canadian historian Timothy Travers also argued that Edmonds was very unfair to Currie since the 1st Canadian Division occupied a position that would have been difficult to defend even under normal conditions, without considering the effects of the first mass use of poison gas and the complete withdrawal of French forces on their left flank. Although acknowledging that Currie had made mistakes, Travers maintained that unlike the Algerians who fled, Currie's 2nd Brigade held its ground at Ypres, consequently losing 46% of its total strength either killed or wounded over two days of fighting.

Following the battle, Currie was promoted to major-general, and given command of the entire 1st Canadian Division. He was also appointed a Companion of the Order of the Bath (CB) and a Commander of the Legion d'Honneur.

By late 1916, the four Canadian divisions were in France, gathered together as the Canadian Corps under the command of Sir Julian Byng. The British High Command informed Byng that the Canadians would have a central role in the upcoming Battle of Arras by attacking Vimy Ridge, northeast of Arras on the western edge of the Douai Plains. Byng ordered Currie to study the Battle of the Somme and advise what lessons could be taken and applied. Currie was also among a set of officers who attended a series of lectures hosted by the French Army regarding their experiences during the Battle of Verdun. Currie not only questioned senior French officers but also sought out junior officers and asked the same questions, carefully noting the discrepancies between the senior officers' beliefs and the junior officers' experiences. On 20 January 1917 Currie began a series of well received lectures to Corps and divisional headquarters based on his research. In response to the Verdun visit, organizational changes were made to the platoon structure within the infantry battalions that would later become corps-wide changes. In his report, Currie evaluated not only the French tactics but also what the Canadians had done wrong in the fighting around Pozières in 1916. Currie summarized the primary factors behind successful French offensive operations as: careful staff work, thorough artillery preparation and support, the element of surprise, and a high state of training in the infantry units detailed for the assault.

Currie, in command of the 1st Canadian Division, was responsible for the broad southern sector of the Canadian Corps advance and expected to make the greatest advance in terms of distance. The attack was to begin at 5:30am on Easter Monday, 9 April 1917. By the end of the first day, the 1st Canadian Division had captured all of its first line objectives and the left half of its second line. The next morning by 9:30am, fresh troops had leap-frogged existing battalions to advance to the third objective line. To permit the troops time to consolidate the third line, the advance halted and the barrage remained stationary for ninety minutes while machine guns were brought forward. Shortly before 1:00pm, the advance recommenced and, by 2:00pm, the 1st Canadian Division secured their final objective.

The British First Army commander Lieutenant-General Henry Horne ordered the Canadian Corps to relieve I Corps opposite the city of Lens on 10 July 1917, and directed Currie to develop a plan for capturing the city by the end of July 1917. The operation was intended to engage as many German formations as possible and to prevent them from reinforcing the Ypres sector during the Third Battle of Ypres. After examining the area, Currie instead proposed to take the high ground outside the city, marked on allied maps as Hill 70, hold the feature in the expectation of a German counterattack, and inflict casualties by preparing a zone of concentrated artillery and machine gun fire. Currie's plan was implemented successfully, and by the end of the battle, some 20,000 Germans had been killed or wounded at the cost of 9,000 Canadians. The operation was effective in preventing German formations from transferring local men and equipment to Ypres, and Haig believed that the Battle of Hill 70 was one of the finest minor operations of the war.

The Canadian Corps was then transferred from Lens to Ypres to take part in the Battle of Passchendaele. Currie was tasked with continuing the advance started by the now exhausted II Anzac Corps in order to ultimately capture Passchendaele village and gain favourable observation positions and drier winter positions. Currie submitted his provisional operational plan on 16 October and presented a plan with extensive resources made available in reserve. He estimated the attack would result in 16,000 casualties. Currie's preparations included reconnaissance, road construction and a massing of artillery and heavy machine guns. Rather than one mass assault, Currie designed a series of well-prepared, sharp attacks that allowed the Corps to take an objective and then hold it against the inevitable German counterattacks. By 30 October, the Canadians, aided by two British divisions, gained the outskirts of the village in a driving rainstorm, and then held on for five days against intense shelling and counter-attacks, often standing waist deep in mud as they fought. The Canadians' victory came at the cost of 15,654 casualties, including 4,028 killed. Currie's grim casualty prediction had been accurate.

On 21 March 1918 the Germans launched a major Spring Offensive hoping to force an armistice on their terms, but by the summer their forward momentum had been contained and the Allies prepared to counterattack. In August 1918, when Currie was ordered to move the corps south to Amiens, the Canadians took pains to camouflage their move. This included sending a radio unit and two battalions to Ypres as a diversion. With no preliminary artillery bombardment at Amiens to warn the Germans, the attack on 8 August was a success. The Canadians were withdrawn from the line, and moved to the Somme, where they participated in the attack on the Hindenburg Line at the Drocourt–Quéant Line on 2 September. The assault resulted in the Germans being overrun along a front. Historian Denis Winter called the seizure of the Drocourt–Quéant line by the Canadian Corps the "greatest single achievement" of the British Expeditionary Force during the entire war, and praised Currie for his ability to bring an "unprecedented" concentration of artillery and machine gun fire together with flexible infantry sections that were adjusted for the situation. The German Seventeenth Army then retreated behind the flooded Canal du Nord. Currie took three weeks to prepare perhaps his most audacious plan: he suggested the entire corps cross the drier section of the canal on a front of only . On 27 September the entire corps moved across the canal as planned, and then through the German lines in a series of planned zig-zag manoeuvres designed to confuse the Germans. Exhausted and demoralized, the German army staged a controlled retreat over the next five weeks. On 10 November, in what was to be his most controversial decision, Currie, under orders to continue to advance, ordered elements of the corps to liberate Mons. On the morning of 11 November, as Currie received orders confirming there would be a general armistice at 11:00am, the capture of Mons was completed.

In December 1918, Currie established the Canadian War Narrative Section to maintain a level of control as to how the Canadian contribution to the Hundred Days Offensive would be documented in print and presented to the public. Tim Cook argues that the Canadian War Narrative Section was an important step in not only recording and presenting the achievements of the Canadian Corps but also in restoring Currie's damaged reputation, which had been battered by Sam Hughes and his supporters in Parliament. Hughes frequently referred to Currie as a butcher.

Although Currie was awarded only a small portion of the value sought, newspapers across Canada referred to the result as a victory for him. The trial helped to restore Currie's reputation; however, the stress took a toll on his health. Currie was subsequently elected Dominion president of the Canadian Legion of the British Empire Service League in 1928. However, he suffered a stroke the following year and his ill health obliged him to resign, whereupon he was bestowed with the honorary title of Grand President.

Currie was survived by his wife, Lucy, and a son and daughter. Lucy was left in some financial difficulty following her husband's death when McGill decided it could not afford to continue paying her a portion of his salary. In 1935 the Canadian government finally recognized his service to Canada by granting $50,000 to his estate.

Many tributes have been made to Currie. In 1919 General Currie Elementary School was built in Richmond, British Columbia. A Sir Arthur Currie Elementary School under the Protestant School Board of Greater Montreal was also built.